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Abstract. We are concerned with theoretical aspects of computer viruses.
For this, we suggest a new definition of viruses which is clearly based on
the iteration theorem and above all on Kleene’s recursion theorem. We
show that we capture in a natural way previous definitions, and in par-
ticular the one of Adleman. We establish generic constructions in order
to construct viruses, and we illustrate them by various examples. We
discuss about the relationship between information theory and virus and
we propose a defense against some kind of viral propagation. Lastly, we
show that virus detection is Π02 -complete. However, since we are able
to deal with system vulnerability, we exhibit another defense based on
controlling system access.
1 Introduction
Computer viruses seem to be an omnipresent issue of information tech-
nology; there is a lot of books, see [13] or [16], discussing practical issues.
But, as far as we know, there are only a few theoretical studies. This sit-
uation is even more amazing because the word “computer virus” comes
from the seminal theoretical works of Cohen [4–6] and Adleman [1] in
the mid-1980’s. We do think that theoretical point of view on computer
viruses may bring some new insights to the area, as it is also advocated
for example by Filiol [8], an expert on computer viruses and cryptology.
Indeed, a deep comprehension of mechanisms of computer viruses is from
our point of view a promising way to suggest new directions on virus de-
tection and defence against attacks. On theoretical approach to virology,
there is an interesting survey of Bishop [2] and we aware of the paper of
Thimbleby, Anderson and Cairns [10] and of Chess and White paper [3].
This being said, the first question is what is a virus? In his Phd-
thesis [4], Cohen defines viruses with respect to Turing Machines. Roughly
speaking, a virus is a word on a Turing machine tape such that when it
is activated, it duplicates or mutates on the tape. Adleman took a more
abstract formulation of computer viruses based on recursive function in
order to have a definition independent from computation models. A recent
article of Zuo and Zhou [21] completes Aldemans work, in particular in
formalizing polymorphic viruses. In both approaches, a virus is a self-
replicating device. So, a virus has the capacity to act on a description of
itself. That is why Kleene’s recursion theorem is central in the description
of the viral mechanism.
This paper is an attempt to use computability and information the-
ory as a vantage point from which to understand viruses. We suggest a
definition which embeds Adelman’s as well as Zuo and Zhou’s definitions
in a natural way.
A virus is a program v which is solution of the fixed point equation
ϕv(p, x) = ϕB(v,p)(x) (1)
where B is a function which describes the propagation and mutation of
the virus in the system. This approach has at least three advantages
compared with others mentioned above. First, a virus is a program and
not a function. Thus, we switch from a purely functional point of view to
a more programming perspective one.
Second, we consider the propagation function, unlike others. So, we
are able to have another look at virus replications. All the more so since
B corresponds also to a system vulnerability. Lastly, since the definition
is clearly based on recursion theorem, we are able to describe a lot of
kind of virus smoothly. To illustrate our words, we establish a general
construction of trigger virus in Section 3.3.
The results and the organization of the paper is the following. Section
2 presents the theoretical tools needed to define viruses. We will focus in
particular in the s-m-n theorem and the recursion theorem. In section 3,
we propose a virus definition and we pursue by a first approach to self-
duplication. Section 4 is devoted to Adlemans virus definition. Then, we
explore another duplication methods by mutations. We compare our work
with Zuo and Zhou definition of polymorphic viruses. Lastly, Section 6
ends with a discussion on the relation with information theory. From that,
we deduce an original defense against some particular kind of viruses,
see 6.3. The last Section is about virus search complexity which turns out
to Π02 -complete. It is worth to mention that we conclude the paper on
some research direction to study system flaws, see Theorem 14.
2 Iteration and Recursion Theorems
2.1 Programming Languages
We are not taking a particular programming language but we are rather
considering an abstract, and so simplified, definition of a programming
language. However, we shall illustrate all along the theoretical construc-
tions by bash programs. The examples and analogies that we shall present
are there to help the reader having a better understanding of the main
ideas but also to show that the theoretical constructions are applicable
to any programming language.
We briefly present the necessary definitions to study programming
languages in an independent way from a particular computational model.
We refer to the book of Davis [7], of Rogers [15] and of Odifreddi [14].
Throughout, we consider that we are given a set D, the domain of the
computation. As it is convenient, we take D to be the set of words over
some fixed alphabet. But we could also have taken natural numbers or
any free algebra as domains. The size |u| of a word u is the number of
letters in u.
A programming language is a mapping ϕ from D → (D → D) such
that for each program p, ϕ(p) : D → D is the partial function computed
by p. Following the convention used in calculability theory, we write ϕp
instead of ϕ(p). Notice that there is no distinction between programs and
data.
We write f ≈ g to say that for each x, either f(x) and g(x) are defined
and f(x) = g(x) or both are undefined on x.
A total function f is computable wrt ϕ if there is a program p such
that f ≈ ϕp. If f is a partial function, we shall say that f is semi-
computable. Similarly, a set is computable (resp. semi-computable) if its
characteristic function is computable (semi-computable).
We also assume that there is a pairing computable function ( , )
such that from two words x and y of D, we form a pair (x, y) ∈ D.
A pair (x, y) can be decomposed uniquely into x and y by two com-
putable projection functions. Next, a finite sequence (x1, . . . , xn) of words
is built by repeatedly applying the pairing function, that is (x1, . . . , xn) =
(x1, (x2, (. . . , xn) . . .)).
So, we won’t make any longer the distinction between a n-uple and
its encoding. Every function is formally considered unary even if we have
in mind a binary one. The context will always be clear.
It is worth to mention that the pairing function may be seen as an
encryption function and the projections as decryption function.
Following Uspenski [19] and Rogers [15], a programming language ϕ
is acceptable if
1. For each semi-computable function f , there is a program p ∈ D such
that ϕp ≈ f .
2. There is an universal program u which satisfies that for each program
p ∈ D, ϕu(p, x) ≈ ϕp(x).
3. There is a program s such that
∀p, x, y ∈ D ϕp(x, y) ≈ ϕϕs(p,x)(y)
Of course, the function ϕs is the well-known s-m-n function written
S.
The existence of an acceptable programming language was demon-
strated by Turing [18].
Kleene’s Iteration Theorem yields a function S which specializes an
argument in a program. The self-application that is S(p,p) corresponds
to the construction of a program which can read its own code p. By
analogy with bash programs, it means that the variable $0 is assigned to
the text, that is p, of the executed bash file.
We present now a version of the second recursion theorem which is
due to Kleene. This theorem is one of the deepest result in theory of
recursive function. It is the cornerstone of the paper that is why we write
the proof. We could also have presented Rogers’s recursion theorem but
we have preferred to focus on only one recursion theorem in order not to
introduce any extra difficulties. It is worth also to cite the paper [11] in
which the s-m-n function and the recursion theorem are experimented;
Theorem 1 (Kleene’s second recursion Theorem). If g is a semi-
computable function, then there is a program e such that
ϕe(x) = g(e, x) (2)
Proof. Let p be a program of the semi-computable function g(S(y, y), x).
We have
g(S(y, y), x) = ϕp(y, x) (3)
= ϕS(p,y)(x) (4)
By setting e = S(p,p), we have
g(e, x) = g(S(p,p), x) (5)
= ϕS(p,p)(x) (6)
= ϕe(x) (7)
3 The viral mechanism
3.1 A virus definition
A virus may be thought of as a program which reproduces, and executes
some actions. Hence, a virus is a program whose propagation mechanism
is described by a computable function B. The propagation function B
searches and selects a sequence of programs p = (p1, . . . ,pn) among in-
puts (p, x). Then, B replicates the virus inside p. In other words, B is
the vector which carries and transmits the virus to a program. On the
other hand, the function B can be also seen as a flaw in the programming
environment. Indeed, B is a functional property of the programming lan-
guage ϕ which is used by a virus v to enter and propagate into the system.
We suggest below an abstract formalization of viruses which reflects the
picture that we have described above.
Definition 2. Assume that B is a semi-computable function. A virus wrt
B is a program v such that for each p and x in D,
ϕv(p, x) = ϕB(v,p)(x) (8)
The function B is called the propagation function of the virus v.
Throughout, we call virus a program, which satisfies the above defi-
nition.
As we have said above, we make no distinction between programs and
data. However we write in bold face words of D, like p,v, which denote
programs. On the other hand, the argument x does not necessarily denote
a data. Nevertheless, in both cases, p or x refer either to a single word or
a sequence of words. (For example x = (x1, . . . , xn).)
3.2 Self-reproduction
A distinctive feature of viruses is the self-reproduction property. This has
been well developed for cellular automata from the work of von Neu-
mann [20]. Hence, Cohen [4] demonstrated how a virus reproduces in the
context of Turing machines.
We show next that a virus can copy itself in several ways. We present
some typical examples which in particular illustrate the key role of the
recursion Theorem.
We give a first definition of self-reproduction. (A second direction
will be discussed in Section 5.) A duplication function Dup is a total
computable function such that Dup(v,p) is a word which contains at
least an occurrence of v. A duplicating virus is a virus, which satisfies
ϕv(p, x) = Dup(v,p). The existence of duplicating viruses is a conse-
quence of the following Theorem by setting f = Dup.
Theorem 3. Given a semi-computable function f , there is a virus v such
that ϕv(p, x) = f(v,p)
Proof. For set g(y,p, x) = f(y,p). Recursion Theorem implies that the
semi-computable function g has a fixed point that we call v. We have
ϕv(p, x) = g(v,p, x) = f(v,p).
Next, let e be a code of g, that is g ≈ ϕe. The propagation function
B induced by v is defined by B(v,p) = S(e,v,p), since
ϕB(v,p)(x) = ϕS(e,v,p)(x) (9)
= g(v,p, x) = ϕv(p, x) (10)
It is worth to say that the propagation function lies on the s-m-n S
function. The s-m-n S function specializes the program e to v and p, and
thus it drops the virus in the system and propagates it. So, in some sense,
the s-m-n S function should be be considered as a flaw, which is inherent
to each acceptable programming language.
To illustrate behaviors of duplicating viruses, we consider several ex-
amples, which correspond to known computer viruses.
Crushing
A duplication function Dup is a crushing if Dup(v,p) = v.
This basic idea is in fact the starting point of a lot of computer viruses.
Most of the email worms use this methods, copying their script to
many directories. The e-mail worm “loveletter” copies itself as “MSKer-
nel32.vbs”. Lastly, here is a tiny bash program which copies itself.
cat $0 > $0 . copy
Cloning
Suppose that p = (p1, . . . ,pn). Then, a virus is cloning wrt Dup, if
Dup(v,p) = (d(v,p1), . . . , d(v,pn)) where d is a duplication function. A
cloning virus keeps the structure of the program environment but copies
itself into some parts. For example, we can think that p is a directory
and (p1, . . . ,pn) are the file inside. So a cloning virus infects some files
in the directory.
Moreover, a cloning virus should also verify that |d(v,pi)| ≤ |pi|.
Then, the virus does not increase the program size, and so the detection
of such non-size increasing virus is harder.
A cloning virus is usually quite malicious, because it overwrites exist-
ing program. A concrete example is the virus named “4870 Overwriting”.
The next bash program illustrates of a cloning virus.
for FName in $ ( l s ∗ . i n f e c t . sh ) ;do
LENGTH=‘wc −m ./$FName ‘
i f [ . /$FName != $0 −a ”193” − l e ”${LENGTH%∗./
$FName}” ] ; then
echo [ $0 i n f e c t . /$FName ]
cat $0 > . /$FName
f i
done
Ecto-symbiosis
A virus is an ecto-symbiote if it lives on the body surface of the program
v. For example, Dup(v,p) = v · p where · is the word concatenation.
The following bash code adds its own code at the end of every file.
for FName in $ ( l s ∗ . i n f e c t . sh ) ;do
i f [ . /$FName != $0 ] ; then
echo [ $0 i n f e c t . /$FName ]
t a i l $0 −n 6 | cat >> . /$FName
f i
done
The computer virus “Jerusalem” is an ecto-symbiote since it copies
itself to executable file (that is, “.COM” or “.EXE” files).
3.3 Implicit viruses
We establish a result which constructs a virus which performs several
actions depending on some conditions on its arguments. This construction
of trigger viruses is very general and embeds a lot of practical cases.
Theorem 4. Let C1, . . . , Ck be k semi-computable disjoint subsets of D
and V1, . . . , Vk be k semi-computable functions There is a virus v which
satisfies for all p and x, the equation
ϕv(p, x) =







V1(v,p, x) (p, x) ∈ C1
...
Vk(v,p, x) (p, x) ∈ Ck
(11)
Proof. Define
F (y,p, x) =







V1(y,p, x) (p, x) ∈ C1
...
Vk(y,p, x) (p, x) ∈ Ck
(12)
The function F is computable and has a code e such that F ≈ ϕe. Again,
recursion Theorem yields a fixed point v of F which satisfies the Theorem
equation. The induced propagation function is V (v,p) = S(e,v,p)
4 Comparison with Adleman’s virus
Adleman’s modeling is based on the following scenario. For every pro-
gram, there is an “infected” form of the program.
The virus is a computable function from programs to “infected” pro-
grams. An infected program has several behaviors which depend on the
input x. Adleman lists three actions. In the first (13) the infected program
ignores the intended task and executes some “destroying” code. So it is
why it is called injure. In the second (14), the infected program infects the
others, that is it performs the intended task of the original, a priori sane,
program, and then it contaminates other programs. In the third and last
one (15), the infected program imitates the original program and stays
quiescent.
We translate Adleman’s original definition into our formalism.
Definition 5 (Adleman’s viruses). A total computable function A is
said to be a A-viral function (virus in the sense of Adleman) if for each
x ∈ D one of the three following properties holds:
Injure
∀p,q ∈ D ϕA(p)(x) = ϕA(q)(x) (13)
This first kind of behavior corresponds to the execution of some viral
functions independently from the infected program.
Infect
∀p,q ∈ D ϕA(p)(x) = A(ϕp(x)) (14)
The second item corresponds to the case of infection. One sees that
any part of ϕp(x) is rewritten according to A.
Imitate
∀p,q ∈ D ϕA(p)(x) = ϕp(x) (15)
The last item corresponds to mimic the original program.
Our definition respects Adleman’s idea and implies easily the original
infection definition. In Adleman’s paper, the infection definition is very
closed to the crushing virus as they have defined previously. However,
our definition of the infect case is slightly stronger. Indeed, there is no
condition or restriction on the application of the A-viral function to A
to ϕp(x) unlike Adleman’s definition. Indeed, he assumes that ϕp(x) =
(d,p1, . . . ,pn) and that A(ϕp(x)) = (d, a(p1), . . . , a(pn)) where a is a
computable function which depends on A.
Theorem 6. Assume that A is a A-virus. Then there is a virus which
performs the same actions that A.
Proof. Let e be the code of A, that is ϕe ≈ A. There is a semi-computable
function App such that App(x, y, z) = ϕϕx(y)(z). Suppose that q is the
code of App. Take v = S(q, e). We have
ϕA(p)(x) = ϕϕe(p)(x)
= App(e,p, x)
= ϕq(e,p, x)
= ϕS(q,e)(p, x)
= ϕv(p, x)
We conclude that the propagation function is B(v,p) = A(p).
5 Polymorphic viruses
Until now, we have considered viruses which duplicate themselves without
modifying their code. Now, we consider viruses which mutate when they
duplicate. Such viruses are called polymorphic; they are common com-
puter viruses. The appendix gives more “practical informations” about
them.
This suggests a second definition of self-reproduction. A mutation
function Mut is a total computable function such that Mut(v,p) is a
word which contains at least an occurrence of a virus v′. The difference
with the previous definition of duplication function in Subsection 3.2 is
that v′ is a mutated version of v wrt p.
5.1 On polymorphic generators
Theorem 3, and the implicit virus Theorem 4, shows that a virus is essen-
tially a fixed point of a semi-computable function. In other word, a virus
is obtained by solving the equation: ϕv(p, x) = f(v,p, x). And solutions
are fixed points of f . Rogers [15] established that a computable function
has an infinite number of fixed points. So, a first mutation strategy could
be to enumerate fixed points of f . However, the set of fixed points of
a computable function is Π02 , and worst it is Π
0
2 -complete for constant
functions.
So we can not enumerate all fixed points because it is not a semi-
computable set. But, we can generate an infinite number of fixed points.
To illustrate it, we suggest to use a classical padding function Pad
which satisfies
1. Pad is a bijective function.
2. For each program q and each y, ϕq ≈ ϕPad(q,y).
Lemma 7. There is a computable padding function Pad.
Proof. Take T : D ×D → D as a computable bijective encoding of pairs.
Let π1 be first projection function of T . Define Pad(q, y) as the code of
π1(T (q, y)).
Theorem 8. Let f be a computable function. Then there is a computable
function Gen such that
Gen(i) is a virus (16)
∀i 6= j, Gen(i) 6= Gen(j) (17)
ϕGen(i)(p, x) = f(Gen(i),p) (18)
Proof. In fact, Gen(i) is the ith fixed point of f wrt to a fixed point
enumeration procedure. A construction of a fixed point enumeration pro-
cedure is made by padding Kleene’s fixed point given by the proof of the
recursion Theorem.
For this, suppose that p is a program of the semi-computable function
g(S(y, y), x). We have
g(S(y, y), x) = ϕp(y, x) (19)
By setting Gen(i) = S(Pad(p, i),Pad(p, i)), we have
g(S(Pad(p, i),Pad(p, i)), x) = ϕp(Pad(p, i), x) (20)
= ϕPad(p,i)(Pad(p, i), x) Pad’s dfn (21)
= ϕS(Pad(p,i),Pad(p,i))(x) (22)
Remark 9. For a virus writer, a mutation function is a polymorphic en-
gine, such as the well known “Dark Avenger”. A polymorphic engine is
a module which gives de ability to look different on replication most of
them are encryptor, decryptor functions.
5.2 Zuo and Zhou’s viral function
Polymorphic viruses were foreseen by Cohen and Adleman. As far as we
know, Zuo and Zhou’s are the first in [21] to propose a formal definition
of the virus mutation process. They discuss on viruses that evolve into
at most n forms, and then they consider polymorphism with an infinite
numbers of possible mutations.
Definition 10 (Zuo and Zhou viruses). Assume that T and I are
two disjoint computable sets. A total computable function ZZ is a ZZ-
viral polymorphic function if for all n and q,
ϕZZ(n,q)(x) =





D(x) x ∈ T Injure
ZZ(n + 1, ϕq(x)) x ∈ I Infect
ϕq(x) Imitate
(23)
This definition is closed to the one of Adleman, where T corresponds to
a set of arguments for which the virus injures and I is a set of arguments
for which the virus infects. The last case corresponds to the imitation
behavior of a virus. So, the difference stands on the argument n which
is used to mutate the virus in the infect case. Hence, a given program
q has an infinite set of infected forms which are {ZZ(q, n) | n ∈ D}.
(Technically, n is an encoding of natural numbers into D.)
Theorem 11. Assume that ZZ is a ZZ-viral polymorphic function. Then
there is a virus which performs the same actions that ZZ wrt a propagation
function.
Proof. The proof is a direct consequence of implicit virus Theorem 4 by
setting p = (n,q).
6 Information Theory
There are various way to define a mutation function. A crucial feature of
a virus is to be as small as possible. Thus, it is much harder to detect it.
We now revisit clone and symbiote virus definitions.
6.1 Compressed clones
A compressed clone is a mutated virus Mut(v,p) such that |Mut(v,p)| <
|v|. A compression may use informations inside the program p. There are
several compression algorithms which perform such replications.
6.2 Endo-Symbiosis
An endo-symbiote is a virus which hides (and lives) in a program. A
spyware is a kind of endo-symbiote. For this, it suffices that
1. We can retrieve v and p from Mut(v,p). That is, there are two inverse
functions V and P such that ϕV (Mut(v,p)) ≈ ϕv and ϕP (Mut(v,p)) ≈ ϕp
2. To avoid an easy detection of viruses, we impose that
|Mut(v,p)| ≤ |p|
3. We suppose furthermore that
|V (Mut(v,p))| + |P (Mut(v,p))| ≤ |Mut(v,p)|
Both examples above show an interesting relationship with complexity
information Theory. For this, we refer to the book of Li and Vitányi [12].
Complexity information theory leans on Kolmogorov complexity. The
Kolmogorov complexity of a word x ∈ D wrt ϕe and knowing y is
Kϕe(x|y) = min{|q| : ϕe(q, y) = x}. The fundamental Theorem of Kol-
mogorov complexity theory yields: There is universal program u such that
for any program e, we have Kϕu(x|y) ≤ Kϕe(x|y)+c where c is some con-
stant. This means that the minimal size of a program which computes a
word x wrt y is Kϕu(x|y), up to an additive constant.
Now, suppose that the virus v mutates to v′ from p. That is Mut(v,p) =
v′. An interesting question is then to determine the amount of informa-
tion which is needed to produce the virus v′. The answer is Kϕu(v
′|(v,p))
bits, up to an additive constant.
The demonstration of the fundamental Theorem implies that the
shortest description of a word x is made of two parts. The first part
e encodes the word regularity and the second part q represents the “ran-
domness” side of x. And, we have ϕe(q, y) = x. Here, the program e plays
the role of an interpreter which executes q in order to print x. Now, let us
decompose v′ into two parts (i) an interpreter e and (ii) a random data
part q such that ϕv′ = ϕϕe(q,v,p). In this construction, the virus intro-
duces an interpreter for hiding itself. This is justified by the fundamental
Theorem which says that it is an efficient way to compress a virus. In [9],
Goel and Bush use Kolmogorov complexity to make a comparison and
establish results between biological and computer viruses.
6.3 Defense against endo-symbiotes
We suggest an original defense (as far as we know) against some viruses
based on information Theory. We use the notations introduced in Sec-
tion 6 about endo-symbiosis and Kolmogorov complexity.
Our defense prevents the system to be infected by endo-symbiote.
Suppose that the programming environment is composed of an interpreter
u which is a universal program. We modify it to construct u′ in such way
that ϕu′(p, x) = ϕϕu(p)(x). Hence, intuitively a program for ϕu′ is a
description of a program wrt ϕu.
Given a constant c, we define a c-compression of a program p as a
program p′ such that ϕu(p
′) = p and |p′| ≤ Kϕu(p) + c. Observe that
ϕu′(p
′, x) = ϕp(x).
Now, suppose that v is an endo-symbiote. So, there is a mutation
function Mut and two associated projections V et P . We have by definition
of endo-symbiotes that |V (Mut(v,p′))|+|P (Mut(v,p′))| ≤ |Mut(v,p′)| ≤
|p′|. By definition of P , we have ϕp′ = ϕP (Mut(v,p′)). As a consequence,
ϕu(p
′) = ϕu(P (Mut(v,p
′))) = p. So, |P (Mut(v,p′))| ≥ Kϕu(p). Finally,
the space |V (Mut(v,p′))| to encode the virus is bounded by c. Notice that
it is not difficult to forbid ϕu′ to execute programs which have less than c
bits. In this case, no endo-symbiote can infect p′. Therefore, c-compressed
programs are safe from attack by endo-symbiotes.
Of course, this defense strategy is infeasible because there is no way
to approximate the Kolmogorov complexity by mean of a computable
function. In consequence, we can not produce c-compressed programs.
However, we do think this kind of idea shed some light on self-defense
programming systems.
7 Detection of viruses
Let us first consider the set of viruses wrt a function B. It is formally
given by VB = {v | ∀p, x : ∃y : ϕv(p, x) = y ∧ ϕB(v,p)(x) = y}. As the
formulation of VB shows it, we have:
Proposition 12. Given a recursive function B, VB is Π
0
2 .
Theorem 13. There are some functions B for which VB is Π
0
2 -complete.
Proof. Suppose now given a computable function t, it has an index q. It
is well known that the set T = {i | ϕi = t} is Π2-complete. Define now
B(y, p) = S(q, p). Observe that a virus v verify: ∀p, x : ϕv(p, x) = t(p, x).
The pairing procedure being surjective, v is an index of t. Conversly,
suppose that e is not a virus. In that case, there is some p, x for which
ϕe(p, x) 6= ϕB(e,p)(x) = t(p, x). As a consequence, it is not an index of t.
So, VB = T .
Theorem 14. There are some functions B for which it is decidable whether
p is a virus or not.
Proof. Let us define f(y,p, x) = ϕy(p, x). Being recursive, it has a code,
say q. Application of s-m-n Theorem provides S(q, y,p) such that for
all y,p, x, we have ϕS(q,y,p)(x) = f(y,p, x). Let us define B(y,p) =
S(q, y,p). It is routine to check that for all d, d is a virus for B. So,
in that case, any index is a virus.
A consequence of this is that there are some weakness for which it
is decidable whether a code is a virus or not. This is again, as far as we
know, one of the first positive results concerning the detection of viruses.
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A Polymorphic Viruses
A method widely used for virus detection is file scanning. It uses short
strings, refered as signatures, resulting from reverse engineering of viral
codes. Those signatures only match the considered virus and not healthy
programs. Thus, using a search engine, if a signature is found a virus is
detected.
To avoid this detection, one could consider and old virus and change
some instructions in order to fool the signature recognition. As an illus-
tration, consider the following signature of a viral bash code
for FName in $ ( l s ∗ . i n f e c t . sh ) ;do
i f [ . /$FName != $0 ] ; then
cat $0 > . /$FName
f i
done
The following code denotes the same program but with an other signature
OUT=cat
for FName in $ ( l s ∗ . i n f e c t . sh ) ;do
i f [ . /$FName != $0 ] ; then
$OUT $0 > . /$FName
f i
done
Polymorphic viruses use this idea, when it replicates, such a virus
changes some parts of its code to look different.
Virus writers began experimenting with such techniques in the early
nineties and it achieved with the creation of mutation engines. Historically
the first one was “Dark Avenger”. Nowadays, many mutation engines
have been released, most of them use encryption, decryption functions.
The idea, is to break the code into two parts, the first one is a decryptor
responsible for decrypting the second part and passing the control to it.
Then the second part generates a new decryptor, encrypts itself and links
both parts to create a new version of the virus.
A polymorphic virus could be illustrated by the following bash code,
it is a simple virus which use as polymorphic engine a swap of two char-
acters.
SPCHAR=007
LENGTH=17
ALPHA=
azertyuiopqsdfghjklmwxcvbnAZERTYUIOPQSDFGHJKLMWXCVBN
CHAR1=${ALPHA: ‘ expr $RANDOM % 52 ‘ : 1}
CHAR2=${ALPHA: ‘ expr $RANDOM % 52 ‘ : 1}
#add the decryp tor
echo ”SPCHAR=007” > . / tmp
echo ” t a i l −n $LENGTH \$0 | sed −e \” s /$CHAR1/\
$SPCHAR/g\” −e \” s /$CHAR2/$CHAR1/g\” −e \” s /\
$SPCHAR/$CHAR2/g\” −e \” s /SPCHAR=$CHAR2/SPCHAR=
$SPCHAR/g\”> . / vx” >> . / tmp
echo ” . / vx” >> . / tmp
echo ” e x i t 0” >> . / tmp
#encrypt and add v i r a l code
cat $0 | sed −e ” s /$CHAR1/$SPCHAR/g” −e ” s /$CHAR2/
$CHAR1/g” −e ” s /$SPCHAR/$CHAR2/g” −e ” s /SPCHAR=
$CHAR2/SPCHAR=$SPCHAR/g” >> . / tmp
#in f e c t
for FName in $ ( l s ∗ . i n f e c t . sh ) ;do
cat . / tmp >> . /$FName
done
rm −f . / tmp
B Metamorphic viruses
To detect polymorphic computer viruses, anti virus editors have used
code emulation techniques and static analysers. The idea of emulation, is
to execute programs in a controled fake environment. Thus an encrypted
virus will decrypt itself in this environment and some signature detection
can be done. Concerning static analysers, they are improved signature
maching engines which are able to recognize simple code variation.
To thward those methods, since 2001 virus writers has investigated
metamorphism. This is an enhanced morphism technique. Where poly-
morphic engines generate a variable encryptor, a metamorhic engine gen-
erates a whole variable code using some obfuscation functions. Moreover,
to fool emulation methods metamorphic viruses can alter their behavior
if they detect a controled environment.
When it is executed, a metamorphic virus desassembles its own code,
reverse engineers it and transforms it using its environment. If it detects
that his environment is controled, it transforms itself into a healthy pro-
gram, else it recreates a new whole viral code using reverse ingineered
information, in order to generate a replication semantically indentical
but programmatically different.
Such a virus is really difficult to analyse, thus it could take a long
period to understand its behavior. During this period, it replicates freely.
Intuitively, polymorphic viruses mutates without concidering their en-
vironment whereas metamophic viruses spawn their next generation using
new information. As a matter of fact, to capture this notion, one must
consider the equation ϕv(p, x) = f(v,p, x) in its entirety.
